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dence.' 5 While the Court, in refusing to lay down a specific rule
against comment on refusal of a co-indictee to testify and emphasizing
the elaboration of the comment in the instant case, somewhat limited
its holding, it does extend protection to the accused from prejudicial
comments by over-zealous prosecutors.
L. F. Martin, Jr.

CONsTITUTONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT PROCEED-

INc-Appellant, fifteen years old, was charged with having used an
automobile without the owner's consent. At a hearing before the juvenile Court, he admitted the charge and was committed to a training
school. Appellant was not represented by counsel, nor was he advised
that he might be so represented. Some three months after the hearing,
counsel appeared for him and filed a motion to vacate the court's judgment on the ground that appellant had been deprived of his constitutional right to counsel. Denial of the motion was appealed to the
Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which affirmed the Juvenile Court's judgment.' Upon appeal the United States
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, Held: Reversed and remanded.
The Juvenile Court was required to inform the delinquent that he had
a right to counsel. Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F. 2d 666
(D.C. Cir. 1956).

Are juvenile court proceedings of such a nature as to require the
furnishing of constitutional guaranties of fair criminal procedure to
offenders appearing therein? This is the basic question underlying the
principal case. While the court decided only the narrow question of
the right to counsel in such proceedings, the broader question would
seem to be correlative to the narrow one. The court in holding that
one appearing before a juvenile court has a right to counsel, specifically refused to reach consideration of the due process requirements
involved,2 but the tenor of the opinion leads to the conclusion that had
the question of the right to constitutional guaranties in general been
presented, the court would have answered in the affirmative. The
opinion reviewed the purpose of the District of Columbia statute
15 23 C.J.S. 551 (1940).

1 Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 114 A. 2d 896 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C.
1955).
2 Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 286 F. 2d 666, 669
n. 18 (D.C. Cir.
1956). The court based its holding on the "right to be heard" provision of the

D.C. Code sec. 11-915 (1951).
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creating juvenile courts3 and, while "recognizing and approving the

laudable objectives of this system of "individualized justice' ",4 realistically determined that since the juvenile court had the power to
deprive the child of his liberty, 5 the "'right to be heard' when personal
liberty is at stake requires the effective assistance of counsel in a
juvenile court quite as much as it does in a criminal court."8
That juvenile court proceedings, as such, are constitutional is too
well settled to require discussion. 7 The rights accruing to those
brought before such tribunals are not so well settled as to preclude
comment, however. While it is sometimes blandly stated that the
rights of an accused in a criminal are not available to infants held
before juvenile courts, there appears to be growing unrest among
courts having opportunity to inquire into and determine the application of the rule. One aim of legislation creating juvenile courts is to

provide a system whereby problems of juvenile delinquency can be
solved in an informal atmosphere without the technicalities and publicity of a criminal proceeding. The juvenile court is to function in a
paternal manner, with guidance and rehabilitation, rather than retribution, as its purpose. Commitment by the juvenile court is merely a
restraint which the state may exercise under its power as parens patriae
for the good of the child. In view of these noble objectives, juvenile
court proceedings are universally considered to be non-criminal in
nature and have not been thought to require the procedural safeguards
which are regarded as essential to a criminal prosecution. 8 Children

within the jurisdiction of juvenile courts, therefore, have been denied

trial by jury, 9 privilege against self-incrimination; 10 right of appeal;"
confrontation by witnesses against them; 12 arraignment, plea, or war3

D.C. Code sec. 11-902 (1955 Supp.).
"Purpose of Juvenile Court Act of District of Columbia is 'promotion of
child's welfare and state's best interest by strengthening of family ties where
possible, and, when necessary, removing the child from custody of parents for his
welfare or safety or protection of public, securing for him custody, care and ro
tection as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given
by his parents.'
4 Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 286 F. 2d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
5 D.C. Code sec. 11-915 (1955 Supp.).
0 Supra note 4 at 669.
7See 43 C.J.S. 225 et. seq. (1945) for a comprehensive discussion of the
constitutionality of juvenile court legislation. See also 81 Am. Jur. 784 et seq.
(1940).
8 1 Wharton's Criminal Law 485 et seq. (12th ed. 1932). See also the discussions reflecting this attitude in Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678
(1923), and People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
9 See, for example, Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205
(1980);
State ex rel Olsen v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 52 N.W. 935 (1892).
10 People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
11 Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205 (1930); Marlowe v.
Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 106, 133 S.W. 1137 (1911).
12 Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1928).
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rant of arrest;13 right to bail; 14 protection against double
jeopardy; 15
16 and right to appointment of counsel.x7
notice or hearing;
Is the denial of these constitutional procedural safeguards justified?
Can rights such as these be adequately replaced by the informal
atmosphere of even the most ideal juvenile court system? Assuming,
for the sake of argument, that these rights would not be necessary in
a perfect juvenile court system, an examination of juvenile courts in
action will disclose the great contrast between theory and fact-ideal
and reality.
Juvenile court judges are to be chosen because of their acquaintance with and understanding of social problems and child psychology.
In reality, such judges are often elected by popular vote, or by appointment, without regard to qualification.' 8 In all probability most juvenile
judges are appointed more on the basis of their political background
than on the basis of any special qualification regarding the handling
of children.
Since the proceedings are "non-criminal" in nature, no criminal
stigma attaches to offenders heard before juvenile courts. As a practical matter, a great many public sanctions may be imposed upon the
youthful offender with a juvenile court record. Let the youth with a
record of juvenile court commitment attempt to join the armed services
or attain a position of trust, and the stigma of a juvenile court record
is apt to become very pronounced. 19
The courts are informally conducted, thus doing away with the
frightening feature of a criminal trial and the resultant feeling in the
child that he is being persecuted by society. Actually, juvenile courts
are no more informally conducted than are criminal courts in many
jurisdictions. 20 As to the child's attitude after being committed by
such an informal proceeding, it is submitted that any consolation he
may receive from the proceeding's being informal rather than formal
is likely to be small indeed. The child will, in all probability, feel just
as persecuted as if he had been sentenced before a criminal court.
Indeed, considering the deprivation of procedural rights, he may feel
even more persecuted than he would if he had appeared before a
criminal court with these rights afforded him.
13 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198 (Pa. 1905); Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah
473, 88
P. 609 (1907).
14 Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W. 2d 576 (1945).
'5 In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P. 2d 503 (1943).
16 Rule v. Geddes, 28 D.C. Cir. 31 (1904).
17 Moore v. Commonwealth, 298 Ky. 14, 181 S.W. 2d 413 (1944).
'sSussman, Law of Juvenile Delinquency: The Laws of 48 States, Legal
Almanac Series No. 22, Oceana Publication p. 51 (1950, as cited in 2 Cath. L.
Rev. 96 n. 26 (1951).
19
20 Inre Contreras, 787 Cal. App. 241, 241 P. 2d 631, 633 (1952).
Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F. 2d 666, 668 n. 10 (1956).
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Commitment to an institution by juvenile court is not punishment
nor a deprivation of liberty, but is merely for guidance, care, education
and training. This is the most objectionable aspect of the juvenile court
system. The courts restrain the juvenile and commit him to an institution for purposes of "custody and care".2 ' It does not "punish the infant by confinement, nor deprive him of his liberty; it only recognizes
and regulates, as in providing for guardianship and apprenticeship, the
parental custody which is an incident of infancy".2 2 In the writer's
opinion, incarceration by any other name is just as obnoxious. The
deprivation of liberty and freedom of movement is just as complete
when one is confined for "custody and care" as a delinquent as when
one is confined as punishment for being a criminal when it is remembered that the institutions to which delinquents are confined are often
a far cry from the scholarly institutions the social workers would seem
to require.2 3 There is the further disconcerting fact that under the
typical juvenile court system,24 an infant becomes a ward of the court
until age twenty-one, and may be confined in an institution until he
reaches that age. It is entirely possible that a child can be placed
in an institution for a period far in excess of the maximum punishment
provided for a similar offense in a criminal court. Reviewing the situation in its entirety, it appears that juvenile courts do deprive children
of their liberty, and it also appears that such deprivation is without
due process of law.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants a
right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions. This provision of the Constitution has been interpreted to mean that not only does the accused
in a Federal court have a right to hire counsel, but that the court must
assign counsel if the defendant is unable to hire one. 25 Further, the
gravity of the offense charged is not determinative, 26 so long as it is not
Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203, 6 N.E. 880 (1886).
Id., at 831.
Glueck, Crime and Justice, 49-53 (1936); Rubin, Protecting the Child in
the Juvenile Court, 43 Jour. Crim. L. 425, 433 (1952). See also, State v. Ray, 63
21
22
23

N.H. 406, 55 Am. Rep. 458 (1885).
24

See, for example, D.C. Code sec. 11-907(d) (1951); 1 Fla. Stat. 39.02(5)

(1955); Ky. Rev. Stat. 208.200 (a), (b), and (c) (1953).
25 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
26 Evans v. Rives, 126 F. 2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
Defendant, convicted of non-support of his minor children in Juvenile Court
for the District of Columbia, was sentenced by the court to a term of one year.
The court in holding that right to counsel obtained in such cases said: ". . . The
purpose of the guaranty is to give assurance against deprivation of life or liberty
except strictly according to law .... And so far as the right to the assistance of
counsel is concerned, the Constitution draws no distinction between loss of liberty
for a short period and such loss for a long one." Query-Does the Constitution
draw a distinction between loss of liberty in a reformatory and in a penitentiary?
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a "petty" one.27 It is an elementary principle, however, that the rights
granted under the first eight Amendments do not apply to proceedings
in the state courts,28 and the right to counsel granted by the Sixth
Amendment has been specifically held to be no exception to this principle.29 There still remains, however, the question of whether or not
a denial of right to counsel is a violation of "due process of law" as
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.30 Failure to appoint
counsel in state prosecutions of capital offenses is clearly a violation
of due process.3 1 Failure to appoint counsel in prosecutions of lesser
crime has been the subject of sharp dispute in the Supreme Court.3 2
The Court has held certain "exceptional circumstances" to require the
appointment of counsel in non-capital cases, 33 and has emphasized,
many times, the special need for protection, under due process, of
the young and immature.3 4 Consider, for example, the language of the
Court in Wade v. Mayo:
There are some individuals who, by reason of age, ignorance or
mental incapacity are incapable of representing themselves adequately
in a prosecution of a relatively simple nature. .

.

. Where such in-

capacity is present, the refusal to appoint counsel is a denial of due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.35

While the Supreme Court has gone no further than to hold that a

denial of right to counsel in criminal cases is a violation of due process,
its attitude in cases involving inexperienced, youthful defendants indicates that it is opposed to any denial of rights based on sterile technicalities. The purpose of requiring due process is to protect one from
being deprived of his liberty without having had benefit of a fair
27 Shick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904).

28
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Brown v. New Jersey,
175 U.S.
172 (1899).
29
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). See, however, Justice Black's dissent
in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1946).
30 United States Constitution, Art. 14, see. 1.
of life, liberty, or property, withnor shall
o.*. process
of any
law...State deprive any person
out due
31Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
3
2 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
33
Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
34
De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947) (17 year-old was not advised of right to counsel or of serious nature of plea of guilty to a first-degree
murder charge); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947) (18 year-olds denial of
habeas corpus set aside); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (15 year-old's conviction based on coerced confession was set aside-denial of counsel was one of
the facts considered); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (18 year-old conviction set aside because of a refusal of counsel on request); Uneges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) (17 year-old entitled to habeas corpus, even though
he had entered plea of guilty, because he had not been advised of his right to
counsel).
35 334 U.S. 672, 684 (1948).
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hearing. If one may be deprived of his liberty in a so-called "noncriminal" proceeding, then the rights consistent with due process must
also extend to such hearings if the spirit and intent of the due process
requirement is to be met.
Juvenile court legislation has done much to improve upon our
judicial system. Its goals, standards, and ideals are commendable.
The fact remains, however, that the practice does not yet measure up
to the theory-the reality has not yet equated the ambition. Until the
juvenile courts can more closely approach the ideals set for them, it is
believed that children brought before them should never be deprived
of their liberty without benefit of procedural due process safeguards.
It is strongly urged that the example set by the District of Columbia3 6
and Californiao 7 should be followed.38 The purpose of juvenile legislation is to enhance the position of the juvenile offender before our
courts. It is difficult, therefore, to justify a denial of procedural safeguards when such denial will certainly make his position less secure.
Why should an infant be denied those privileges and rights accruing
to the adult offender? To say, "Because the infant doesn't need such
protection in view of the fact that the proceeding is non-criminal",
is to allow legal fictions and semantic manipulation to overcome reason
and common sense.3 9
Charles L. Calk
CONsTrruToNAL LAW-RACIAL DiscnmnNATioN-DENiAL

oF DUE PRoc-

Ess-Relators, three Chinese-born minors, claimed admission to the
United States as citizens by derivation from one Lee Ha, concededly
an American citizen and alleged to be their father. The Board of
Special Inquiry, Immigration and Naturalization Service, solely on the
basis of blood grouping tests held to preclude paternity, rejected their
claim and they were taken into custody pursuant to that determination.
Habeas Corpus was then brought against the District Director of
3

6 In addition to the instant case, see In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (1955).
In re Contreras, 241 P. 2d 631 (Cal. C.A. 1952).
38 Id. at 633. While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a
minor to be a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime,
this is a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence to
37

reaso.....

3" For further evidence of what may be a trend in the right direction, see
Ex Parte State ex rel. Echols, 245 Ala. 353, 17 So. 2d 449 (1944) (which indicated that having an attorney representing the infant in juvenile court was not
only entirely proper, but may have been a matter of right, where a pending prosecution for murder entered into the issue of delinquency); Dendy v. Wilson, 142
Tex. 460, 179 S.W. 2d 269 (1944) (which held that the privilege against selfincrimination extends to juvenile court proceedings).

